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Understanding ethnomethodology seems to pose severe
problems for many social scientists. The discussions and critiques
o,f ethnom~th?dology ,by nonpractitioners are almost uniformly
VIewed by insiders as Incompetent, and that is often so for even
the ~ympathetic discussants. It is my intention, here, to try to
provide the grounds for an intuitive grasp of what "classical"
ethnomethodology 1 is about and to do so in a way in which it can
also be appreciated just why this discipline should be so difficult
to grasp. One, of t~e difficulties in understanding
ethnomethodology IS that It both involves a substantive area of
study, and its practice requires the use of a specific attitude or
posture which is related to but different from that of traditional
s~ci?l~gy. Th~s ~eans that ethnomethodology is, in a sense, adIS~Iplin; whIC~ IS distinct from sociology, although both its
attitudes and Its subject matter are related to and relevant to the
concerns of sociology.
. G~fmke1 coined the term "ethnomethodology" (recounted
m Ga~nke1, 1974, pp. 15-18) after seeing interests cognate to his
own m thedeve10ping "ethnosciences" of ethnobotany
ethnomedicine, ethnopharmacology, ethnogeology, and the like.3'
It was the initiating .idea of ethnoscience and. some of its
descriptions which caught Garfinkel's attention and not the
specific attitudes; orientations, theories, and methods which, in .
fa~t, markedly contrast with those of ethnomethodology (cf.
WIeder,. 1970; and Eglin, 1975). The initiating idea of the
ethnosciences was the notion that the knowledge possessed by
members of some societies could be viewed as analogous to the
knowledge systems of the sciences (cf. Sturtevant, 1964,
pp. 91-100; Tyler, 1969, pp. 5-7).
Along the same lines, one could also propose an
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ethnosociology which inquires into folk. theories,. co~cept.s,
methods of theorizing, and the like which are soclOloglcal m
character. For example, what forms of role theory, if any, are
employed by the members of some society, and ~ow do. these
theories organize the world of roles as they are expenenced m that
society. In its relationship to the ethnosciences, ethnomethodology
is the general study of the methods employed in folk-disciplines of
ethno-aisciplines. ·
The word "methods" in ethnomethodology means simply
"methodology," as in the methods of science-chemistry, biology,
sociology even history, etc. Just as we have found analogues to
botany in the field of study of ethnobotany, we can find
analogues to scientific reasoning in the reasoning of "the
folk"-hence, we have ethnomethodology (see especially
Garfinkel, 1967, Chapts. 1,2,3,4, and 8).
Furthermore, in some ultimate sense, since the sciences are
also social activities, they too are analyzable as ethno- or
folk-disciplines, so eventually a complete ethnomet~odology
would also describe and analyze the methods of the sciences as
well. Indeed, one recent ethnomethodological study concerns the
situated methods and practices involved in using the microscope
(Lynch,1974). . ..
In order to clarify what ethnomethodology 18 about, It will
be useful to exemplify the order of affairs that one sees if one
looks "ethnomethodologically" or "ethnosociologically."
AN EXAMPLE OF OBSERVING
.. ETHNOMETHODOLOGICALLY_ETHNOSOCIOLOGICALLy~ ..
If we~op~ a posture which provides us ·wlth some distance
from the ordinary familiarity of the objects and events of o~r
everyday lives and which is disconnected from the themat~c
concerns and relevancies of that life, we might quickly see that m
every society, and within every social ~c~ne within ~hose s~ieties,
the nonverbal activities of the partlclpants are mtermlttendy,
though frequently, punctuated with verbal accounts conc~rning
those very same activites. Some of these accounts consist of
descriptions, evaluations, explanations, and analyses of current
2
Ethnomethodology and Ethnosociology
activities, while others concern plans, forecasts, and prophesies,
and yet others recount precedents, histories, and memories. We
c~uld see childre~ discussing the differences between boys and
grrls and speculating on the likely adult careers of each of their
peers. We could see lovers gently or angrily explaining to one
another how they were unavoidably late because of the patterns of
traffic on this particul~ day. We could s~e a parole officer writing
a report about the continued bad behavior of one of his parolees
:m~ just why it was to be expected that the parolee would behave
In Just that way. In various governmental meetings, we could see
assorted special~s:s.testifying about social and nonsocial objects,
e:e~ts, and activities in their society. For example, in the late
sIXt~es. and early seventies, we could have seen sociologists
testifying about the causes of violence in the ghettos, the patterns
and consequences of smoking marijuana, and the known effects of
consuming pornography.
. Large portions of human activity are devoted to accounts.
The amount of time that societal members devote to the
assimilation of, reflection upon, and production of accounts is
related to .their social,positions. It appears that all competent
members, m Garfi~kel s. sense (1967, p. 57 ftn.), can give such
accounts. The SOCIally Incompetent are either unable to offer
accounts, e.g., the comatose, some catatonic schizophrenics and
t~e severely retarded, or their accounts are ignorable and
discountable, e.g., the accounts of children, some of the insane,
the less severely retarded, criminals, etc. On the other hand, the
ac~ounts of some st?rytellers ar.e ~ccorded special warrant, e.g.,
. pnests and shamans.in some societies and scientists. in others..The
history of' natural science, medicine, and current social science
makes it clear, however, that these special claims are not-always
accepted.
Since the stories of social scientists concern action and
situations of action, they share content with the bulk of stories
t~ld by everyday folk. On the one hand, social scientists are
d~~ferentiated from laymen in that they appear to be more
diligent, careful, and precise in gathering evidence and in their
an~yses (however, see Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 104-115), and in that
their methods and their logic have been explicity codified. On the
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other hand, there are many similarities between the stories of
social scientists and others.i They even use some of the same
concepts, and, from time to time, social scientists and others
engage each other as equals and debate questions. w.e coul~: finally
note that social scientists are not always successful m gettmg their
special claims accepted outside their own profession. The
responses of politicians and the public. to the ~ecently
commissioned reports to Congressional committees on violence,
pornography, and marijuana show this rather clearly.
In both cases, human stories, told either by ordinary people
or by those professionally charged with s~ch storytelling, ~lay
similar roles. They are simultaneously stones about the society
and constituent events within it. Ethnomethodologists use the
term "reflexive" to refer to this feature of social accounts-that
they are features of the very scenes which they desc~be.~ .
Although storytelling makes use of language sk~s~ Its w~rk ~s
not captured by formal linguistics. It is a type of aCtIVltywhich 1S
consequential for the objects and events which it describes.
Storytelling organizes the perceptual world by making observable
and understandable the patterns of collective life and the
individual activities which contribute to those patterns. Rather
than being a simple, passive, coding process wherein prestructured
objects and events in the surrounding perceptual world are
identified as instances of a class, storytelling actively contributes
to the structure of that world. From the standpoint of a
"storyhearer," the heard content of a story contributes to the
formation of perceptual objects in the surrounding world by
'serving as "instructions to perception-;"· These "instructions . to
.. perception" are synthesized with directly perceived features of, the
surrounding world (e.g., a body movement) in such a way as to
make up the constitu tive features of a perceived object as a
gesralt-contexture," The orderliness that societal members detect
and experience in their own activities and those of their fellows is
thus an achieved orderliness that is accomplished through (the
hearing of) their own describing work.
One of the principal ways that experienced, creatively
revealed, and portrayed orderliness in human affairs is
accomplished is through the perception and description of those
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affairs as motivated. Accounts of motives and action take
characteristic form whenever humans explain, predict, justify, 0:mer~ly make sensible some ac~ivity through the act of telling
stones".Weber (1947) called this form of exposition a "correctcaus~ . Interpretation of action. " Although he meant to be
descr~b~ng the task of the scholar who is directed toward
explaInIng uniform patterns of behavior, as Schutz noted (1967
p. ~32), the form of the story applies as well to the explanation~ordIn~ laymen offer of an individual's conduct. A "correct
causal Interpretation" shows how the behavior or action i
question follows from, and can be predicted by, some particular
course of reasoning on the part of the acting individual. That
course of reasoning is typically described in terms of motives and
rules.
SOME PARTIAL DEFINITIONS
These observations and initial analyses provide a context for
the following definitions of ethnosociology -and
ethnomethodology .8
(1) Ethnosociological studies are the general substantive
study of storytelling by humans about humans. They are
obViously. closely related to ethnopsychology ande~hnopsyc~Jatry.We may anticipate that we can discover many~Ifferent ~Ind~, of stories, storytelling, and storytellers, and even
storyheanng, etc. I expect that we may find interesting
relationships between all these matters, and that, in some respects,
these matters bear on the differing ways in which a. story is
accepted and acted upon by societal members.
(2) Ethnomethodology would then concern the formal
properties of stories ~d storytelling which might better be
thought of as the practical methodological concerns that societal
members have. They are concerned with such features of their
~tories as objectivity, facticity, rationality, logicality, and the like
In. wa.ys that appear to parallel the methodological concerns of
sciennsrs. Th~se mat~ers of objectivity, facticity, and so forth
seem to be directly Iinked to the acceptability of a story and its
perceived usability as grounds for further inference and action.
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Both ethnomethodology and ethnosociology are concerned with
the consequences of storytelling for. the structuring of social
environments.
We are now in a position to more specifically layout the
methodological steps that permit and sustain the ethnosociolo~cal
and ethnomethodological vision. The defmitions that have Just
been offered primarily concern the subject matter of the
ethno-disciplines. We now seek to explicate the a~titude or
methodological-theoretical-analytic posture of ethnosociology and
ethnomethodology·
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY,
AND THE NATURA-L ATTITUDE
"Classical" ethnomethodology's relationship to Husserlian
phenomenology is obvious with regard to many general matter~,
provides the motivating rationale fo: ~u~h of et~~omethodologys
radical character and is problematic in Its specifics (see footnote
10). Quite ind~pendently o~ the argume?t that "classical"
ethnomethodology is some variant of Husserl~ phenomenolo~,
a matter that is clearly part of the dispute concernmg
ethnomethodology (see Bauman, 1973; Coser, 1975; Mehan and
Wood, 1976; Zimmerman, 1976), it is important to note some
comparabilities. .
Whereas the Husserlian phenomenologist understands the
experientially objective, factual, a~onymous, unifo~m, resistant,
typical, familiar features of the Me-world as a.chlevements of
consciousness,. the "classical" ethnomethodologist understands
these same rational features as "ongoing achievements of the
concerted --- commonplace .activities" of [lay or' professional]
investigators" (Garfinkel, 1967, r- 11), i.e., as the ac.hievements of
lay or professional investigative and accountmg methods.
Although it is beyond the scope of the presen~ paper to elab~rate
the matter, it appears that "methods" are phenomenologIcally
analyzable as matters of active synthesis, along with those ot~er
affairs which Husserl identifies as works of formal and practical
reason such as collecting, counting, dividing, predicating, inferring,
and so forth (cf. Husse'r!, 1960, P: 77).
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A characteristic feature of those experiential affairs which C\re
given through the synthetic activities of consciousness (in
phenomenology) or methods (in "classical" ethnomethodology) is
that they exist with the features they display independently of the
beholder and his methods of apprehension, that they have th<ise
features for everyone, and that the witnessed affairs display
structured features (e .g., uniformities, repetitions,
standardizations, etc.) which are likewise features of the
unwitnessed but, piece by piece, witnessable world. (On the
ethnomethodological side, see Garfinkel, 1967, Chapt. 1; Pollner,
1970; Wieder, 1974; Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970; Zimmerman
and Wieder, 1970.) It is here that phenomenology and "classical"
ethnomethodology are radical departures from the natural and
traditional social sciences and the implicit, science-founding
world-view of laymen everywhere-that sort of unformulated naive
realism which Husserl (1962) identified as the Natural Standpoint,
further analyzed by Schutz (1962, 1964) as the Natural Attitude,
and by Garfinkel as the "seen but unnoticed background
expectancies" (1967, Chapt. 2). The radical departure is this: that
the objective-rational features of witnessed events are, for laymen
and (ordinary) scientists, presuppositions, while for
phenomenology and ethnomethodology, they are phenomena for
investigation-phenomena whose apprehension establishes and
thematizes the domain to be investigated.
Despite all the differences between science and common
sense, there is a major point in common among all the varieties of
perspectives within professional sociology and between it and
common-sense sociology. One's own acts are not considered as
consequential activities within the world under investigation, but
'are merely acts toward it, where that world is pie-given· as
autonomous, structured, and resistant. That is, one's own actions
are conceived as practical actions directed toward a world that has
been investigated, or practical acts of investigation directed toward
an autonomous investigatable world. In neither case are one's own
acts regarded as both about and within that same world as aspects
of it.9
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THE ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL ATTITUDE
The ethnomethodological attitude departs fro~ the
traditional social scientific attitude in specific ways. While the
life-world under investigation in the social sciences is the world of
others in "classical" ethnomethodology, it is not just a world of
others' but it is also a world that includes me (the investigator)
and my acts as well. Here, the world is first a world given to me
through my acts, for example, acts of investigati~n or acts of
perception. Others "occupy'~ this world as objects of my
perceptive, cognitive, investigatIve acts... .
Like the person adopting the sociological .p~sture, m ~he
account of Schutz (1962, pp. 245-259), the indtvtdual. adoptmg
the ethnomethodological attitude also no lo~er expenences t?e
world as structured with himself and his practIcal concerns at Its
center. Like, and perhaps even more than, the traditional
sociologist, he detaches himself from his ~:Vn prac~ical concerns,
but none the less sees himself and his acnvity as directed toward
and within the very world that he investigates. .
Like the phenomenologist, the ethnomethodolo.gtst bra~ke~s
or suspends certain aspects of the world that he exp~r:ences. Wlth~
the ethnomethodological attitude. While no longer hv:ng n~v~ly in
the practical intentions of daily life, he attempts to hv~ w1thm the
methods of inquiry of that practical life and then to withdraw and
reflect on them while "reducing" them to mere methods of
inquiry and the co~elative object~ of inquiry-b~~ objects
inquired into and reported about. I m1ght note that this 1S roughly
equivalent to the phenomenological~pocheo.f "red..uc~g" the -
world to the neotic-noematic correlatlon, that 1S, to the intended
object and the act i~ which that object is intend:d. 1 ~
As ethnomethodologist, I shift my attention in such a way
that I put my own perceiving, my own inqu~, into the very
field that I am investigating. My field of study 1S methods-done-m
the-world-while- being_about-that-same-worl~-that.-they-are-done­
within and- sociology- about- the-world-while -~e1ng-done- fr?m
within-it. The reflexivity of these matters is retained as a spe~1fic
feature of interest to me, and it means that I am engaged ill a
descriptive rather than a causal-explanatory task.
8
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Ethnomethodology, of course, is not alone in seeing
sociology as an activity done from within the world. Such shifts of
attention, although with a different emphasis, are also topical for
the sociology of knowledge and for critical theory .
Ethnomethodology, however, does seem to be unique among the
social sciences in considering its very own activities as data and
subject matter. I I
NOTES
1. The ethnomethodology explicated here was conceived in the
approximate period of 1956-1968 by Harold Garfinkel, his students of
that period, especially Egon Bittner, Cicourel, D. Lawrence Wieder, and
Don Zimmerman, and his associates Lindsey Churchill, Craig
MacAndrew, Michael Moerman, Melvin Pollner, Edward Rose, Harvey
Sacks (in his earliest writings), and David Sudnow. Some of the early
writings of Alan Blum and Peter McHugh also belong to that tradition.
Although original work in this tradition is still being published, there has
been a gradual shift among the "classical" ethnomethodologists,
including Garfinkel himself, to a multiplicity of orientations which all
start from the posture of the "classical" tradition which is explicated
here but which is no sense adequately circumscribed by it. None the less,
there are several reasons for explicating the "classical" tradition-(a) the
multiplicity of current perspectives emerged out of analyses and findings
which belong to the "classical" tradition. Even when these later views
appear in opposition to the earlier ones, they are none the less motivated
by them and are most intelligible in their relationship to them as
compared to, e.g., .their relationship to current mainstream sociologyt
(b) when ethnomethodology is referred to in the sociological literature,
e.g., in Coser, 1975; Meltzer, P~tras, and Reynolds, 1975;M~, 1973;
Turner, 1974, it is this "classical" tradition which is referred to; (c) and,
of course, work still goes on within this tradition. Its possibilities were
barely explored by those who since have gone on to other things.
2. By "attitudes," of course, I mean in the Husserlian and Schutzian
phenomenological sense, as in Natural Attitude, Scientific Attitude, and
Phenomenological Attitude (cf. Schutz, 1962, pp. 207-259).
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10. See Cairns, 1940; Gurwitsch, 1966, pp. 124-140; Husserl, 1962, 1970;
Mohanty, 1972, for t~e pheno~enological reduction and its relationship
to the reveal.ed neotic-noemanc correlation, and see Garfinkel, 1967,
pp.31-34; WIeder, 1974, pp.29-31, 39-43; Zimmerman and Pollner~970; Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970, for partial epoches or bracketing~
m ethnomethodology. Whether or not these partial epoches could ever
amount to the phenomenological-transcendental reduction remains an
open questio~ beyond the scope of this paper (see HusserI, 1970, Part
III). Resolution of that question, however, is essential to the
formulation of any precise relationship between Husserlian
.__ phenomenology and "classica)" ethnomethodology.
\
L:
3. A variety of titles refer partially or globally to this area of study-formal
analysis, componential analysis, folk taxonomy, ethnoscience,
'ethnosemantics, and (certain sectors of) socio-linguistics. For general
discussions of the area as a whole, see Sturtevant, 1964; Tyler, 1969,
pp. 1-41; Wieder, 1970; and the classic pieces of Conklin, 1955, 1962;
Frake, 1961, 1962; Goodenough, 1956; and Lounsbury, 1956.
4. This section is closely related to an exposition that Zimmerman and I
put forth in a recent essay (Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976,
pp. 105-107). The notion of the posture of estrangement was suggested
by Pollner's formulation (1970, pp.6-15) or the "transcendental
stranger." (Also see Garfinkel, 1967, P: 37.) The substance, of course,
concerns what Garfinkel calls accounts and accountability (Garfinkel,
1967, Chapt. 1; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970).
5. For technical discussions of the comparability and differences, see
Elliot, 1974; Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 1-34, 76-102, 262-283; Garfinkel and
Sacks, 1970; Ponner, 1970; Schutz, 1962, pp. 3-47,207-259, and 1964,
pp. 64-88; Wieder, 1974, esp. Chapts. 1 and 8; Wieder and Zimmerman,
1976; Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970; Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970.
6. For technical discussions of reflexivity, see Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 1-34;
Mehan and Wood, 1975, pp.8-14, 137-162; Pollner, 1970; Wieder,
1974; Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976.
7. Just how "heard talk" plays a constitutive part in perceivedly organized
environments requires a more extensive discussion than space permits
here. 'See Wieder, 1974. esp. pp. -183-214;·' The formulation of
gestalt-contexture as it is employed there was developed by Gurwitsch
(1964). It should be noted that the argument that that order which is
perceived in everyday life is founded upon the heard content of stories
does not entail the presupposition that the world would otherwise be
experienced as a "buzzing, blooming confusion." The argument put
forth here is consistent with the position that there is a pre-predicative
perceptual organization in our experience upon which are founded
"higher" levels which include such things as cultural objects and
meaningful actions. The position here is generally consistent with that





environments. For an easily accessible exposition of th ." fe organIZatIon 0
stratas of experience and founding-founded levels, see Zaner, 1970
pp.169-174. '
The definitions are adapted from Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976,
pp. 107-108.
This is not to s~y that science and common sense are blind to the ways
that some specific method contributes to that which it reveals in the
sense that it may prejudice one's. apprehension of some state of affairs.
(Indeed, such a possibility establishes many of the methodological
~rob~ems of natural science, social science, and ethno-social science.) It
IS ~hIS which defines the problem of veridicality. Yet the very way in
which v"e~dicality is defined ,and identified preserves the
presuppositional foundation of traditional science and common sense
(cf. Pollner, 1970).
In "classical" ethnomethodology , considering one's own activities as
data and subject matter has meant in practice that the j t·
.. . ' , e Inves igator
considers hIS own or hIS staffs' or his subjects' situated investigative and
conceptual actions qua lay or professional sociology as data and subject
~atter for his ethnomethodological inquiries and reflections (e.g., see
BIttner, 1965, 1967; Cicourel, 1968 1973' Garfmkel 1967 11 3176 '" ,pp. - ,
-103, 104-115, 186-207; Leiter, 1969, 1974; Pollner, 1970, pp. 1973,
1~74; Ramos, 1973; Sacks, 1972; Schwartz, 1971; Sudnow, 1965;
Wieder, 1974; Zimmerman, 1970a 1970b) ThIS· strategy,. seems more a
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matter of defining a problem which is of interest to social scientists
generally, rather than a principled restriction. (See Wilson, 1971, but
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This paper examines Marcuse's approach to the major problem of
capitalism-the domination of subjective reason over objective
reason. It is argued that Marcuse's approach to this problem differs
from the approach of Critical Theory. It is further argued that
there is a contradiction in Marcuse~ argument, namely, the
contradiction between revolutionary change and the change
suggested by Marcuse's aesthetic perspective.
Herbert Marcuse , along with other critical theorists, -has
found the major problem of capitalism, especially in its modern
stage, manifested in the way that instrumental rationality has been
employed. For him, the present stage of history can be singled out
as a period in which the process of rationalization has become
entirely one-sided and limited only to the rationality of methods
and means. The reason for such one-sidedness and limitation,
according to Marcuse and the Critical School, can be found in the
domination of "subjective reason" over "objective reason" .
Rationality, which in its totality aims at the emancipation of man,
has turned out to be the main source of alienation and
self-imprisonment for mankind. The manifestation of one-sided
rationality (instrumental rationality) and alienated man. can be
seen in the dialectical relationships among man, society, and
nature.
In order to explain the dialectical relationships among man,
society, and nature in the contemporary system of domination,
Marcuse argues that a new approach to social phenomenon must
be adopted because the traditional perspectives, including the
instrumental perspective, have not been able to predict the
developments of the present stage of history. According to
Marcuse, a new perspective is needed to understand and guide the
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